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Abstract 
This paper presents a two-agent butter-and-gun neoclassical model of conflict with game-theoretic flavor. 
When each agent-opponent contemplates individual welfare independently and as if the conflict has been 
decided in its favor, the optimum outcome is attained when they become alike in tastes over peace and war 
regardless income distribution. The algebra suggests that this is a matter of putting oneself in the rival’s 
shoes, of sufficing each with half the butter and presumably leave the richer agent its gun superiority 
unexploited. This is what both agents realize that has to be done if they act in a decentralized fashion. 
But, why should the richer opponent dismiss voluntarily its comparative advantage in guns? Therefore, 
beyond the matter of homogeneity in preferences (non-economic homogenization), the conflict cannot be 
resolved unless cooperation towards income-equality (economic-homogenization) induced military 
equilibrium takes place under the auspices of a peace promoting entity. Peacemaking involves the non-
economic homogenization referring to a culture of peace, and peacebuilding alludes to the economic 
homogenization towards inter-agent social-justice.  
Keywords: Conflict, Culture of Peace, International income inequality 
alleviation 
JEL classification:  D74, D63, D51 
 
1. Introduction 
According to Waltz (2000, p. 8): “If one asks what may cause war, the simple answer is 
‘anything.’ ” And, Wallensteen (2002, p. 6) too, writes that: “The causes of war remain, to 
this day, fundamental questions for peace research.” They are two only from the vast 
majority of authors who do not discern between “cause of war” and “reason to go to 
war”. The cause is one and is known from antiquity, from Plato, 427-347 B.C., Phaedo, 
verse 66b: “All wars are made for the acquisition of material goods”. Once this cause is taken 
away, once there is global satisfaction of material goods, a clear global state of peace 
comes up in Coulomb’s (2004) sense. Or, speaking of conflict in general and not just of 
war, an a-conflictual, in Coulomb’s sense again, international state of affairs is established 
as soon as the economics of it are settled. Consequently, the heart of a study in conflict 
resolution should be the study of the economic underpinnings of the particular conflict 
examined each time as follows.  
Tracing the origin of conflict in economics is in the spirit of the Marx, Keynes, List, and 
the German historical school approach to conflict (see e.g. Coulomb 2004). For Plato, 
such an approach is self-evident and might be termed uniformly, Platonian or homo-
economicus approach, adopted by this paper too, as follows: According to welfare 
economics, allocations should be equitable and fair, i.e. efficient and envy-free. The 
emergence of a conflict might be attributed to the violation of one or more of these 
desiderata. Fairness in consumption relates to the structure of individual preferences in 
the act of exchange while equality refers to the relative income position of the trading 
parties. So, a conflict is expected to arise once individual tastes and resource constraints 
do not favor the satisfaction of the desiderata. And, so in turn, the resolution of the 
conflict should be targeting agent-turned-opponent heterogeneity in tastes and income.  
This exactly is the line of reasoning towards conflict resolution by this paper. It is 
Platonian rather than Mercantilist or Classical-Neoclassical. For Mercantilists, conflict is 
the result of the pursuit of international power while Classicals-Neoclassicals maintain 
that conflict originates in ruling class misperception of the national interest. In any case, 
it would just be irrational to engage in international confrontation(s) if not for economic 
ultimately reasons. It is noteworthy that going over the various modern literature surveys 
in the field (see e.g. those by Wallensteen 2002, Spolaore 2009, Bove 2011, and Coyne 
and Pellillo 2011), one realizes that the literature focuses on the circumstances that 
prompt conflict-inducing changes in tastes and incomes, though the point from the 
viewpoint of action is this precisely change; and they not only miss it, but pass it by and 
go directly to the issue of the confrontation per se! This is the reason why Waltz (2000), 
for example, above, says that the source of war can be “anything”.1 The study of this 
“anything” is certainly useful, but when a peacemaking entity is called for to help, the 
sober reality for it is that there has been such a change in attitudes and economic power 
that triggers confrontation, and something has to be done about it… 
In the next section, we investigate what exactly has to be done ideally, that is, within the 
context of a simple but illuminating two-agent butter-and-gun neoclassical model with 
game-theoretic flavor a la Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000). When each agent-opponent 
contemplates individual welfare independently and as if the conflict has been decided in 
its favor, when opponents engage in exchange determined to subdue their rival in a non-
cooperative fashion, the optimum outcome is attained when they become alike in tastes 
regardless income distribution. The algebra suggests that this is a matter of putting 
oneself in the rival’s shoes, of sufficing each with half the butter and presumably leave the 
richer agent its gun superiority unexploited. This is what both agents realize that has to 
be done if they act in a decentralized fashion. But, why should the richer opponent 
dismiss voluntarily its comparative advantage in guns? Therefore, beyond the non-
                                                 
1 For example, Huntington’ hypothesis that: “conflicts occur between groups from different civilizations” 
(Huntington 1996, 137), is falsified by historical and empirical evidence (Fletcher and Iyigun 2009). A 
reason to go to war may very well be cultural differences; but it is a reason invoked upon to cover a long-
standing and escalating economic conflict as the cause of war. 
economic matter of homogeneity in preferences over peace and war, the conflict cannot 
be resolved unless cooperation towards income-equality induced military equilibrium, 
cooperation for economic homogeneity, takes place under a peacekeeping entity, too. 
The concluding section discusses the connection between the pursuit of non-economic 
homogenization by such an entity with peacemaking, while peacebuilding lies in the 
inter-agent social justice advanced by economic homogeneity. 
2. The Agents 
Consider two agents, 1 and 2, whose utility derives from butter, 𝐵, and guns, 𝐺, they 
produce. Agent 𝑖 = 1,2, which may be an individual or collective entity, has its own 
butter, 𝐵𝑖, but claims also 𝑎𝑖𝐵𝑗 , 0 < 𝑎𝑖 < 1, of 𝑗’s, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, butter. That is, part 
𝑎1𝐵2 + 𝑎2𝐵1 of total butter 𝐵 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 is contestable a la Garfinkel and Skaperdas 
(2000). There is clearly a conflict of interest because the total butter constraint will be 
satisfied if 𝑎𝑖𝐵𝑗 = −𝑎𝑗𝐵𝑖. It is this conflict which rationalizes the production of guns; 
conflict, which in the context of this type of analysis, should be ascribed to inequality 
and/or envy. The question now is whether there can still be Pareto efficiency. According 
to theory (see e.g. Brams and Taylor 1995) the answer is in the affirmative. But it is 
shown right away that the conditions under which such an answer deserves merit are 
highly questionable. 
Let 𝐵1 = 𝑏1𝐵 and 𝐵2 = 𝑏2𝐵, with 𝑏2 = 1 − 𝑏1, so that 𝐵𝑖 = (𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)𝐵. Assume 
same production technologies for 𝐵 and 𝐺 regardless agent identity. And, suppose that 
the non-substitution theorem holds (see e.g. Kuga 2001) so that both agents are price-
takers, facing the same relative price 𝑞 of 𝐺 in terms of 𝐵, which is taken to be the 
numeraire good. Agent 𝑖 is called for to maximize its utility, 
𝑈𝑖 = [(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)𝐵]
𝜀𝑖𝐺𝑖
1−𝜀𝑖 
subject to the constraint that 
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)𝐵 + 𝑞𝐺𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖 
where 𝑀 is income and 𝜀 is the fraction of it spent on 𝐵. That is, each agent plans as if 
the conflict has been decided in its favor; this is the common knowledge rationality 
characterizing opponents.  The solution to this interaction problem should comprise by 
extension a general equilibrium once no other agents are assumed in this analytical 
framework. It is easily shown in the Appendix that such equilibrium presupposes the 
satisfaction of the following conditions:  
𝑏1 =
1 − 𝑎1
2 − (𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
⇔  𝑏2 =
1 − 𝑎2
2 − (𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
     (1) 
𝜀1
𝜀2
=
𝑀2
𝑀1
,      (2) 
and  
𝐺1
𝐺2
=
𝑀1 − 𝜀2𝑀2
𝑀2 − 𝜀1𝑀1
.      (3) 
Relationship (1) is one about the optimal butter distribution, (2) explains that this 
distribution should be “respecting” individual preferences and relative income status, 
too, and (3) suggests that the production and consumption of guns should be taking 
notice of what the opponent does about it. These conditions are reasonable; Pareto 
efficiency can be fostered even in the presence of envy and/or inequality induced 
conflict.  
But, their reasonableness is not as innocuous as at first glance appears to be. Note that 
(1) implies that: 
𝑏1 + 𝑎1𝑏2 = 𝑏2 + 𝑎2𝑏1     (4) 
and this in turn that: 
𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗 = 1 2⁄ .     (5) 
That is, Pareto efficiency resolves the conflict by distributing the butter equally. The 
distribution is a fair one because it is also proportional and envy-free (see e.g. Brams and 
Taylor 1995). Nevertheless, given (5), 𝑀1 ≠ 𝑀2 implies that more are the guns that the 
richer agent would produce. And, given that both agents are identical except for gun 
possession, the richer one would prevail in an armed conflict over the other agent, and 
war indeed will be waged. Consequently, the allocation should be not only fair but 
equitable too, if confrontation is to be avoided.  Equality imposes from (2) and (3) the 
equality of 𝑀’s and 𝐺’s too, and hence, an income redistribution. Indeed, such a 
redistribution and agent homogenization are advanced in a context of price-taking and 
identical production agents, too; it is an overall context which cannot logically prompt 
conflict.  
Note that (5) does imply that agents have under fairness the same in effect preferences 
over 𝐵 and hence, the 𝜀’s should be equal. It is a homogenization of preferences not of 
how one consumes one’s bread, but of the preferences over bread and arms, over peace 
and war. This by itself might be attributed to the reluctance of the agents to stretch the 
conflict adopting accordingly a “fill the rival’s shoes” attitude towards it. But, income-
and-gun inequality dictates caution to the weaker party. Fairness involves agent 
homogenization, which the agents can attain willingly by themselves by working towards 
fairness in a decentralized, non-cooperative manner. So, if the origin of the conflict was agent 
heterogeneity, the matter would be easily resolved. But, equitability necessitates income 
redistribution as well, which cannot be carried through willingly if non-cooperation is the 
case; and the redistribution is a must because income inequality does remain a source of 
confrontation. In fact, if agents cooperate, “talk to each other”, this too, can give rise to 
(5) as the Shapley value of a bargaining game, but only under identical security levels, 
which in turn presupposes identical 𝑀’s. A Shapley value can obtain under different 𝑀’s 
and security levels too, but it would not satisfy fairness. It would be an unstable state of 
affairs, having failed to address neither heterogeneity nor inequality as conflict sources. 
In a second-best context, non-cooperation would be preferable to cooperation, since 
fairness at least might be achieved. Therefore, cooperation should be addressing both 
conflict sources, because neither fairness alone nor equality by itself suffices to resolve 
the conflict. It should be cooperation under the coercion of some inter-agent authority, 
because there is no a priori reason why the rich agent should accept an income 
redistribution and disarmament at its expense.2 
3. The Arbitrator 
Let us contemplate at the outset on the two basic factors, influencing the perspective 
under which the mediator might be viewing its task in the context certainly of our 
modeling here. First, the mediator does not have at its disposal any particular policy 
means to use to accomplish its task. A policy instrument that might be used towards that 
end is the tax system of each agent. Let 𝜏𝑖 be the 𝑖th tax rate so that: 𝑞𝐺𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖𝑀𝑖 and 
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)𝐵 = (1 − 𝜏𝑖)𝑀𝑖 ⇒ 
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)𝐵
(1 − 𝜏𝑖)
= 𝑀𝑖 . 
(4) can be given rise if 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗 and 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜏𝑗 . Uniform taxation takes care of the part of 
preference homogenization, which is something upon which an arbitrator may capitalize. 
Also, the utility functions become: 𝑈𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝑖)
𝜀𝑖𝜏𝑖
1−𝜀𝑖𝑀𝑖, and even if the arbitrator 
had Samuelson-Bergson social welfare indifference curves in mind, with optimization 
condition: 
(1 − 𝜏𝑖)
𝜀𝑖𝜏𝑖
1−𝜀𝑖
(1 − 𝜏𝑗)
𝜀𝑗𝜏𝑗
1−𝜀𝑗
=
𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑗
, 
the left-hand fraction would become equal to one and 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗  if equality 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜏𝑗 and 
preference homogenization were present.  
This is the second important factor of which an arbitrator should be aware, namely that 
the need for an egalitarian inter-agent world against conflict does not presuppose a 
Rawlsian view of the world; only that the outcome be Rawlsian in the sense of 
neoclassical fairness-cum-equality. Indeed, solving the original, utility functions for 𝐵, 
equating the resulting expressions, and solving for 𝑈𝑖 in terms of 𝑈𝑗 , the following two 
derivatives obtain: 
                                                 
2 This digression on cooperative game theory makes it clear that “independence” means not bargain, not 
cooperation, not sit down around the table, but interaction in a non-cooperative game a la Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2000). And, as soon as, the agents contemplated are the only ones, the subsequent equilibrium 
is by extension a general one. 
𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑈𝑗
=
𝜀𝑖𝑈𝑖
𝜀𝑗𝑈𝑗
    𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝜕2𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑈𝑗
2 = −
𝜀𝑖𝑈𝑖
𝜀𝑗𝑈𝑗
2. 
That is, 𝑈𝑖 is a bad (as opposed to good) for 𝑗’s welfare, the social welfare indifference 
curves have the shape of a bad in the  𝑈𝑖 − 𝑈𝑗 space, mediator-supervised agent 
communication takes the “bad” away, and the specific new “regular” form that these 
indifference curves assume does not matter to the extent that the outcome is Rawlsian.  
To motivate the necessity of a supra-agent authority in real life, note that it is not only 
the matter of income redistribution that requires coercion by a third-party, by an 
arbitrator, mediator. It is also the need for preference homogenization by itself. A 
practician in the field might endorse our conclusions thus far (or rather the spirit of these 
conclusions given the restrictive assumptions under which they obtain), but not without 
noticing their distance from real-life as to non-economic homogenization as well. In 
reality, there are great many reasons why an individual agent might want and/or have to 
act in isolation from the others. One reason which is readily related to this paper is 
Galtung’s (1969) structural violence, “when basic human needs are not met and life spans 
are shortened because of inequalities in the way political and economic structures of a 
society distribute resources” (Christie et al. 2001, p. 12). For us here the society is the 
inter-agent one, and once structural violence has emerged, it might also provoke 
unwillingness to “homogenize” as Marcus Aurelius, 121-180 A.D., Meditations, Book 6, 
would suggest: “The best revenge is to be unlike him who performed the injury.” Therefore, the 
management of such structural-violence induced unwillingness to “homogenize” or the 
same, the peacemaking needed to pursue social justice through the income 
homogenization too, or the same, to pursue peacebuilding, (concepts cast by Christie et 
al. 2001, p. 13), have to be assigned to some “supra-agent” authority acting on both 
agents even coercively when needed. Indeed, as Bove (2011, p. 80) shows: “Regardless of 
differences in endowments … each side devotes equal effort to coercive appropriative 
activities and as a result achieves equal level of final resources”. 
In view of such considerations that provoke in addition the involvement of the element 
of time, 𝑡, in arbitrator decisionmaking, the problem of an infinitely lived  inter-agent 
authority becomes one of minimizing the quadratic policy cost, 𝐶, function: 
𝐶 = ∫ [ℎ (𝑀𝑖 −
𝑀1 + 𝑀2
2
)
2
+ 𝑛1?̇?1
2 + 𝑛1?̇?1
2] 𝑒−𝑟𝑡
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 
subject to: 
𝑀1 + 𝑀2 =
𝑞𝐺1
𝜏1
+
𝑞𝐺2
𝜏2
 
where 𝑟 is the discount rate, the dot above the policy instrument 𝜏𝑖 denotes time 
derivative while ℎ > 0 and 𝑛𝑖 > 0 capture  the relative costs associated with having the 
policy target variable, 𝑀𝑖 , away from its goal, (𝑀1 + 𝑀2) 2⁄ , on the one hand, and 
changing the instrument, 𝜏𝑖, on the other. Taxes are raised to produce guns and hence, 
the cost of tax-rate adjustment reflects the costliness of adjustment of the armaments. 
Also, the inter-agent mechanism is infinitely lived, because once it is dismantled, conflict 
will resurge. And, as soon as pacification today is as important as pacification tomorrow 
and vice versa, 𝑟 = 0.  
So, rewritting 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑀, with 𝑚𝑖 + 𝑚𝑗 = 1 and 𝑀 = 𝑀1 + 𝑀2, we obtain by solving 
the Euler equation the second order differential equations: 
𝑛𝑖 ?̈?𝑖 − ℎ (𝑚𝑖 −
1
2
) (
𝑞𝐺1
𝜏1
+
𝑞𝐺2
𝜏2
)
𝑞𝐺𝑖
𝜏𝑖
2 = 0,      (6) 
from which we obtain the equilibrium, 𝑚𝑖 = 1 2⁄ , from the intertemporal perspective 
now, given at long-run equilibrium, ?̈?𝑖 = ?̇?𝑖 = 0. Setting 𝑡 = 0  and noting that at the 
optimum, 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 𝜏, one obtains from the standard solution method regarding (6): 
𝜏1 − 𝜏 = 𝐴   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏2 − 𝜏 = 𝐴
𝐺2𝑛1
𝐺1𝑛2
 
where 𝐴 is some arbitrary constant. That is, the tax-rate time derivatives will not be 
zeroed, the 𝜏’s will have to be continually adjusted so as to be closing some proportion 
of the gap between the current and the optimal 𝜏’s, unless the ratio of the tax adjustment 
costs equals the ratio of armaments: (𝑛1 𝑛2⁄ ) = (𝐺1 𝐺2⁄ ). Indeed, at steady state, 𝑚𝑖 =
1 2⁄ , 𝜏1 = 𝜏2 = 𝜏, and (𝑛1 𝑛2⁄ ) = (𝐺1 𝐺2⁄ ) = 1. The satisfaction of this triplet 
describes fully the mission and scope of a supra-agent organization within the particular 
context of this paper. It is the mission of peacebuilding in connection with international 
income and armament differences, and of peacekeeping in connection with an 
international concession for peace, based hopefully on cultural identity respect and not 
on coercion and hence, on disrespect of individual preferences, to ensure such a 
concession.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
The coercion of the stronger on the weaker is now replaced by the would-be coercion of 
the peacemaking and peacebuilding entity on both of them. But, does this “would be” 
stand any chance at all to be nurturing a viable arrangement in the long-run? Indeed, 
there are two reasons why our equilibrium should not be designated as a coercive one. 
Firstly, if the supra-agent organization forges a coercive regime, such a regime cannot last 
forever because simply is at stake with human nature; sooner or later, it will collapse. 
And, second, methodologically, only two players have been modeled and so the existence 
of such an organization must have been endorsed presumably by both of them willfully. 
Indeed, only if agents realize that the supra-agent authority is indispensable to their 
welfare, that is, form lexicographic preferences for it, and are farsighted rather than 
myopic in their decisionmaking, this organization and the equilibrium pursued by it will 
be stable as, for instance, Houba et al. (2013, 2014) would suggest. Viable and sustained 
conflict resolution is synonymous to secular and vigorous peacekeeping authority, 
endorsed by all interested parties. 
This paper confers to these considerations increased appeal, because its peacebuilding 
point of view derives from a formal modeling of the gap in the relevant literature 
according to which: “Whereas scholars have examined primarily the relationship between 
individual inequality and conflict, we argue that horizontal inequalities between politically 
relevant ethnic groups and states at large can promote ethnonationalist conflict”, 
(Cederman et al. 2011, 478). This paper offers a theoretical framework to the empirical 
argument advanced to fill this literature gap regarding the nexus between economic 
heterogeneity and war and peace. And, as to its peacekeeping conclusion, it offers a 
theoretical foundation of what “culture of peace” means, aiding the efforts to define this 
term, albeit recent only efforts (De Rivera 2004). Modern-day globalization is cited as a 
chance towards such a culture once it “embrace[s] a wider domain beyond economics… 
driven by the imperative of social justice and the integrity of national cultures” (Anwar 
2008, 3), that is once it respects the “fractionalization” of the world. Indeed, non-
economic homogenization really means unanimous preferences for peace rather than 
fostering one universal cultural identity. 
In the recent past, Soviet Union with its Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) might had 
been successful towards secular conflict resolution among the participants if their 
relations were not based on violence, on coercion towards one single identity. Also, the 
United Nations, whose very foundation lies in identity respect, is far from satisfying the 
prerequisites for a successful supra-national organization, simply because it was not 
established as breeding grounds for a “culture of peace”, for global preferences for peace 
as well (De Rivera 2004).3 And, the League of Nations was founded neither on identity 
respect nor on such cultural grounds. The same is true for regional institutions like the 
Arab League or the Pan American Union. Much closer to an organization promoting 
economic and non-economic homogenization is the European Union with its Eurozone 
and inside NATO (Hentaller et al. 2012) though the matters of the Greek debt and 
Syrian refugees indicate that there is room for considerable improvement. Without peace 
promoting mechanisms, one way to alleviate the pessimism surrounding real-life conflict 
resolution might be to see agents as players who randomize over the pure strategies of 
war and peace in a sequence of plays. This sequence is known to converge to a pure 
strategy – a la convergence of any sequence of triangles inscribed in circle to equilateral 
triangle, for three players, (McMartin 2010) – to permanent peace, presumably, but it is 
not certain that this will be manifesting prudency and not the aftermath of a global 
holocaust.  
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3 A “United Nations II” would be needed in addition, to handle international income redistribution. 30 out 
of the 100 monetary units earned by country X on the basis of its resources might have to be transferred to 
country Y, having produced on the basis of its own resources 10 monetary units. The term “resources” 
captures all what can corroborate production, (physical capital, age of capital, land, types of land, labor, 
types of labor, climate, culture, gender, religion, etc.), and the transfer would be one of resources for the 
sake of a peace based on mutual respect (lasting peace) and not on ephemeral colonization. 
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Appendix 
The equality of the marginal rates of substitution gives: 
𝐺1
𝐺2
=
𝜀2(1 − 𝜀1)
𝜀1(1 − 𝜀2)
      (𝐴1) 
From the first-order conditions: 
𝐺𝑖 =
(1 − 𝜀𝑖)(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)
𝑞𝜀𝑖
𝐵      (𝐴2) 
Inserting (𝐴2) in (𝐴1), and solving for 𝑏1, expression (1) in the text obtains given that 
𝑏2 = 1 − 𝑏1. Relationship (1) may be rewritten as: 2𝑏1 − 𝑎1𝑏1 − 𝑎2𝑏1 = 1 − 𝑎1 ⇒
𝑏1 − 𝑎1𝑏1 − 𝑎2𝑏1 + 𝑎1 = 1 − 𝑏1 ⇒ 𝑏1 − 𝑎1𝑏1 − 𝑎2𝑏1 + 𝑎1 = 𝑏2 ⇒ 𝑏1 −
𝑎1(1 − 𝑏2) − 𝑎2𝑏1 + 𝑎1 = 𝑏2 and hence, (4) in the text obtains. From (4): 𝑏1 − 𝑏2 =
𝑎2𝑏1 − 𝑎1𝑏2 ⇒ 𝑏1 − (1 − 𝑏1) = −𝑎1𝑏2 − 𝑎1𝑏2 ⇒ 𝑏1 + 𝑎1𝑏2 = 1 2⁄ , and repeating 
these calculation having replaced 𝑏1 by 𝑏2, (5) in the text obtains: 
 Inserting (𝐴2) in the budget constraints and solving for 𝐵 yields: 
𝐵 =
𝜀𝑖𝑀𝑖
(𝑏𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑗)
,      (𝐴3) 
from which the ratio for the two agents gives: 
𝜀1
𝜀2
=
(𝑏1 + 𝑎1𝑏2)𝑀2
(𝑏2 + 𝑎2𝑏1)𝑀1
, 
This ratio becomes expression (2) in the text given (4). And, inserting (2) in (𝐴1) and 
manipulating terms, condition (3) obtains. Finally, (𝐴3) and (𝐴2) produce that: 
𝐺𝑖 =
(1 − 𝜀𝑖)𝑀𝑖
𝑞
.      (𝐴4) 
 
